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Decoy state method closes source security loophole in quantum key distribution (QKD) using
laser source. In this method, accurate estimates of the detection rates of vacuum and single photon
events plus the error rate of single photon events are needed to give a good enough lower bound
of the secret key rate. Nonetheless, the current estimation method for these detection and error
rates, which uses three types of photon intensities, is accurate up to about 1% relative error. Here
I report an experimentally feasible way that greatly improves these estimates and hence increases
the one-way key rate of the BB84 QKD protocol with unbiased bases selection by at least 20%
on average in realistic settings. The major tricks are the use of more than three types of photon
intensities plus the fact that estimating bounds of the above detection and error rates is numerically
stable although these bounds are related to the inversion of a high condition number matrix.
In quantum key distribution (QKD), two trusted par-
ties Alice and Bob share a secret key via preparation
and measurement of photons transmitted through a noisy
channel controlled by an eavesdropper Eve. Most QKD
experiments to date employ phase-randomize Poissonian
distributed photon sources to generate photons at a rea-
sonably high rate and use decoy state method to tackle
Eve’s photon-number-splitting attack on multiple photon
events emitted from the Poissonian sources. (See, for ex-
ample, Ref. [1] for an overview.) The key idea of the de-
coy state method is that although Eve knows the photon
number in each pulse, she does not know the probabil-
ity distribution of photon number from which the pulse
is drawn. So, by preparing each photon pulse indepen-
dently from a collection of Poissonian sources with differ-
ent intensity parameters (in other words, different aver-
age photon number per pulse), Alice and Bob may obtain
a lower bound of the key rate of the final secret key they
share [2, 3]. Decoy state technique can handle a variety
of QKD protocols including those with two-way classical
post-processing [4], those involving the transmission of
qudits [5], and those with finite raw key length [6].
However, the state-of-the-art method to date, which
employs a Poissonian source with three different types of
intensities — one high, one weak and one equals or closes
to zero intensity, is inefficient for two reasons. First, us-
ing weak and zero intensity photon pulses lower the av-
erage photon transmission rate. Second, the provably se-
cure decoy state key rate depends on good enough lower
bounds on parameters YX,0, YX,1, YZ,1 together with a
good upper bound on eZ,1 to be defined later. Nonethe-
less, I am going to report later in the paper that the
bounds of these four parameters obtained through the
state-of-the-art method used in Refs. [2, 3, 6, 7] deviate
from their actual values with an average relative errors
of ≈ 1% over a set of randomly chosen quantum channels.
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Here I show how to perform decoy state QKD using
higher average photon intensity pulses plus refined up-
per and lower bounds on the above four parameters to
give a much improved provably secure key rate in real-
istic settings used in typical QKD experiments with fi-
nite raw key length. The main ingredients used here are
the use of more than three different types of photon in-
tensities plus the observation that the lower and upper
bounds obtained are numerically stable although one has
to effectively invert a large condition number matrix. I
illustrate the key idea using a specific BB84 QKD proto-
col [8] which uses the X measurement results to generate
the raw key and the Z measurement results to check the
channel phase error here. It is straightforward to extend
the analysis to other QKD schemes such as the six-state
scheme and some qudit-based schemes [9, 10].
Suppose Alice and Bob use k ≥ 2 different photon in-
tensities labeled µ1 > µ2 > ⋯ > µk ≥ 0 with probabili-
ties pµ1 , . . . , pµk . The observed average yield per photon
pulse prepared in the B = X and Z bases using intensity
µn is given by [2, 3, 7]
QB,µn =
+∞∑
m=0
µmn YB,m exp(−µn)
m!
, (1)
where YB,m is the probability of photon detection by Bob
given that the photon pulse sent by Alice containsm pho-
tons. (From now on, B denotes either X or Z.) Similarly,
the observed average bit error rate EB,µn is given by
QB,µnEB,µn =
+∞∑
m=0
µmn YB,meB,m exp(−µn)
m!
, (2)
where eB,m is the bit error rate for m photon emission
events prepared in the B basis.
As YB,m and eB,m are independent of the intensity pa-
rameter µn used, they can be in estimated or bounded
by solving Eq. (1) and (2) from a collection of inten-
sity parameters µn’s. Numerical stability issue aside, in-
finitely many intensities µn’s are needed to determine all
2the YB,m’s and eB,m’s. Fortunately, they only need to
know lower bounds of YX,0, YX,1 and an upper bound of
H2(eZ,1) to give a lower bound of the one-way secret key
rate R of the BB84 QKD protocol with the raw key all
coming from X measurements. This is because the secret
key rate R, which is defined as the number of final secret
bits divided by the expected number of photon pulses
sent through the channel, is given by [6]
R = p2
X
{⟨exp(−µ)⟩YX,0 + ⟨µ exp(−µ)⟩YX,1[1 −H2(ep)] − ⟨QX,µH2(EX,µ)⟩ − ⟨QX,µ⟩
ℓraw
[6 log2 χ(k)
ǫsec
+ log2 2
ǫcor
]} . (3)
Here pX is the chance that Alice (Bob) uses X as the prepa-
ration (measurement) basis, the symbol ⟨f(µ)⟩ denotes
∑kn=1 pµnf(µn), H2(x) ≡ −x log2 x − (1 − x) log2(1 − x) is
the binary entropy function, ep is the phase error rate of
the single photon events in the raw key, and ℓraw is the
length of the raw sifted key bits. For BB84, ep → eZ,1
as ℓraw → +∞. Also, the probability that the final se-
cret keys shared between Alice and Bob are different is
at most ǫcor, Eve’s information on the final key is at most
ǫsec [11–13], and χ(k) is a QKD scheme specific factor de-
pending on the number of photon intensities k as well as
the detailed security analysis used. For the case studied
by Lim et al. in Ref. [6], χ(3) = 21.
We shall see from Eq. (4) below, the current method of
getting an upper bound for eZ,1 requires the knowledge
of lower bounds of YZ,0 and YZ,1 plus an upper bound of
YZ,1eZ,1 [6, 7]. The goal, therefore, is to determine the
bounds for the five parameters — YB,m (B = X and Z,
m = 0,1) and eZ,1 — as close to their actual values as
possible using finite types of photon intensities k (and
hence finite number of QB,µn ’s and QB,µnEB,µn ’s). The
current method uses three different intensities µ1 > µ2 >
µ3 ≥ 0 and the corresponding bounds are given by
YB,0 ≥ µ2Q
⟪1⟫
B,µ3
exp(µ3) − µ3Q⟪0⟫B,µ2 exp(µ2)
µ2 − µ3 , (4a)
YB,1eB,1
≤ (QB,µ2EB,µ2)⟪0⟫ exp(µ2) − (QB,µ3EB,µ3)⟪1⟫ exp(µ3)
µ2 − µ3 ,
(4b)
and
YB,1 ≥ µ1
µ1(µ2 − µ3) − µ22 + µ23
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩Q
⟪1⟫
B,µ2
exp(µ2) −Q⟪0⟫B,µ3 ×
exp(µ3) + (µ22 − µ23)[YB,0 −Q⟪0⟫B,µ1 exp(µ1)]
µ21
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭
(4c)
provided that µ1 > µ2 + µ3 [6, 7]. In the above equa-
tions, Q
⟪i⟫
B,µn
=QB,µn+(−1)i∆QB,µn and (QB,µnEB,µn)⟪i⟫ =
QB,µnEB,µn +(−1)i∆(QB,µnEB,µn), where ∆-ed quantities
are the upper bounds on the statistical fluctuation due to
finite size sampling. From the Hoeffding inequality [14],
these fluctuations can be taken to be at most
∆QB,µn = ⟨QB,µ⟩
pµn
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
ln [χ(k)
ǫsec
]
2sB
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎭
1/2
(5a)
and
∆(QZ,µnEZ,µn) = 1
pµn
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
⟨QZ,µ⟩⟨QZ,µEZ,µ⟩ ln [χ(k)ǫsec ]
2sZ
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎭
1/2
(5b)
each with probability at least 1−ǫsec/χ(k), where sB is the
number of bits that Alice prepares and Bob successfully
measures in the B basis. Obviously, sX = ℓraw and sZ ≈(1 − pX)2sX/p2X. Due to finite key length, the phase error
rate of the single photon events in the raw key is upper-
bounded by [15]
ep ≤ eZ,1 + γ¯(ǫsec/χ(k), eZ,1, sZYZ,1⟨µ exp(−µ)⟩/⟨QZ,µ⟩,
sXYX,1⟨µ exp(−µ)⟩/⟨QX,µ⟩) (6)
with probability at least 1 − ǫsec/χ(k), where
γ¯(a, b, c, d) ≡
¿ÁÁÀ(c + d)(1 − b)b
cd
ln [ c + d
2πcd(1 − b)ba2 ].
(7)
(This equation is based on the estimate in Ref. [6], which
in turn is deduced from Eqs. (18) and (22) in Ref. [15].
However, the factor 1/√2π is omitted in Eq. (18); and the
ln2 factor in Eq. (22) should be in the denominator. The
γ¯ above is deducted using the same way as in Ref. [15]
with the corrected equations. Note further that γ¯ is ill-
defined if a, c, d are too large. This is because in such
case no ep ≥ eZ,1 exists with failure probability a. All
parameters used in this paper are carefully picked so that
γ¯ is well-defined.)
Interestingly, the YB,0 bound is tight when µ3 → 0 [6, 7].
(Similar bounds have been reported in Refs. [2, 16].) As
for µ1 and µ2, they cannot be too close to each other in
practice. Otherwise, the YB,1 bound may not be reliable
in the case of finite key length [2]. In most experiments
to date, the key rate R is optimized by choosing µ1 ≳ 0.5,
0.01 ≲ µ2 ≲ 0.1, and µ3 ≈ 0 [17–21].
While this choice of photon intensities can accurately
determine the value of YB,0, it is not very good at esti-
mating YB,1 and eZ,1. Using the above photon intensities,
3ignoring finite key length effect, and by randomly pick-
ing YB,m’s in [0,1] and eZ,m’s in [0,0.5], I numerically
find from Eq. (4) that the average (maximum) relative
errors of the estimated YB,1 and YX,1H2(ep) from their
true values can be as high as ≈ 1% (≈ 5%). The devia-
tion of the estimated YB,1 from its actual value increases
as µ1 or µ2 increase; and the deviation of the estimated
YX,1H2(ep) from its actual value increases as µ1 or eZ,1
increase. Consequently, Alice and Bob face a dilemma.
Using small µ1 and/or µ2 give much better estimates of
YB,1 and YX,1H2(ep) at the expense of a lower raw key
generation rate and hence a lower R. This is particularly
true in the practical situation of a finite raw key length
of ≲ 109 to 1010 bits as using biased choice of photon
intensities pµi ’s cannot increase the key rate too much.
Now, I show how to obtain a higher key rate by us-
ing a few larger µn’s and a better estimates for YB,1
and YX,1H2(ep). The trick is to directly solving Eqs. (1)
and (2) for k ≥ 2 different photon intensities. I rewrite
Eq. (2) as
YB,m = k∑
i=1
(M−1)m+1,i ⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣QB,µi exp(µi) −
+∞∑
j=k
µ
j
iYB,j
j!
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
≡ k∑
i=1
(M−1)m+1,iQB,µi exp(µi) + +∞∑
j=k
Cm+1,jYB,j (8)
for m = 0,1, . . . , k − 1, where Mij = µj−1i /(j − 1)! for 1 ≤
i, j ≤ k. In this way, I may express YB,0, YB,1, . . . , YB,k−1 in
terms of QB,µi ’s for i = 1,2, . . . , k, YB,j ’s for j ≥ k, and the
k × k matrix M−1. Similarly, I use
YZ,meZ,m = k∑
i=1
(M−1)m+1,iQZ,µiEZ,µi exp(µi)
+ +∞∑
j=k
Cm+1,jYZ,jeZ,j (9)
to solve YZ,meZ,m for m = 0,1, . . . , k − 1.
At the first glance, this straightforward approach ap-
pears to be hopeless because accurate bounds of YB,m’s
and YZ,meZ,m’s (m < k) require the number of photon
intensities k to be large. Nonetheless, large k means
that one has to invert the large condition number ma-
trix M so that the solutions of Eqs. (8) and (9) are sen-
sitive to perturbation on YB,j ’s and YZ,jeZ,j ’s (j ≥ k) as
well as uncertainty due to finite sample size for QB,µi ’s
and QZ,µiEZ,µi ’s. Numerical stability is an issue. Also,
the bound on, say, YB,1 requires extremization over all
YB,j ∈ [0,1] for j ≥ k, which further complicates matters.
Upon a second thought, sensitivity to perturbation
and numerical stability are not relevant in computing the
lower bound on R provided that the four variables YX,0,
YX,1, YZ,1 and YZ,1eZ,1 are insensitive to perturbation and
numerically stable. I now report explicit expressions for
the bounds on these four variables and then show that
these expressions are indeed numerically stable.
Multiplying column i of the matrix M by µi and row j
by 1/(j−1)! gives the corresponding Vandermonde’s ma-
trix. So I could use the explicit expression of the inverse
of this Vandermonde’s matrix in Ref. [22] to obtain
(M−1)m+1,i = (−1)k−m−1Simm!∏t≠i(µi − µt) (10)
for all 0 ≤m ≤ k − 1. Here
Sim = ∑′ µt1µt2⋯µtk−m−1 , (11)
where the primed sum is over all 1 ≤ t1 < t2 < ⋯ <
tk−m−1 ≤ k with t1, t2, . . . , tk−m−1 ≠ i. Since {µi}ki=1
is a strictly decreasing non-negative sequence, the sign
of (M−1)m+1,i equals (−1)k−m−i. Thus, a lower bound
of YB,m is obtained by replacing QB,µi in the R.H.S. of
Eq. (8) by Q
⟪k−m−i−1⟫
B,µi
; and an upper bound of YZ,1eZ,1
is obtained by replacing QZ,µiEZ,µi in the R.H.S. of
Eq. (9) by (QZ,µiEZ,µi)⟪k−m−i⟫. These bounds take care
of the worst case deviations of measured QB,µi ’s and
QZ,µiEZ,µi ’s from their actual values due to finite sam-
ple size through the Hoeffding inequality.
As for the extremization of YB,0 and YB,1 over YB,j ’s for
j ≤ k, I need to know the signs of Cm+1,j for all j ≥ k
defined in Eq. (8). In the Appendix, I show that C1j ≥ 0
and C2j < 0 (C1j ≤ 0 and C2j > 0) if k is even (odd).
In both cases, extrema occur when YB,j = 0 or 1 for all
j ≥ k. For better estimation of the four variables YX,0,
YX,1, YZ,1 and YZ,1eZ,1, whose values are less than 1/2
in essentially all practical situations, it makes sense to
bound them via Eqs. (8) and (9) when the extrema occur
when YB,j = YZ,jeZ,j = 0 for all j ≥ k. Hence, the lower
bounds of YB,0 (YB,1) should be found from Eq. (8) by
putting YB,j = 0 for all j ≥ k using QB,µi ’s taken from even
(odd) number of photon intensities. And upper bound of
YB,1eZ,1 should be found from Eq. (9) by putting YZ,jeZ,j =
0 for all j ≥ k using QZ,µiEZ,µi ’s taken from even number
of photon intensities.
To obtain a better bound, more photon intensities can
be used. To obtain a higher key rate R, some of the
photon intensities should be as high as 1. (If µ > 1, the
chance of having multiple photon event is too high that
R is compromised.) Nevertheless, deviations between the
actual and measured values of QB,µi ’s increase as more
photon intensities k is used to obtain a raw key of a given
length ℓraw. These deviations may further amplify by
M−1 in Eqs. (8) and (9). My numerical finding suggests
that four to five photon intensities seem to give optimal
key rates using realistic parameters. Out of the k photon
intensities, I use data from the least 2⌊k/2⌋ of them to
obtain the lower bound of YX,0 and the upper bound of
YZ,1eZ,1. And I use data from the least 2⌊(k − 1)/2⌋ + 1
photon intensities to obtain the lower bound of YB,1. To
sum up, the bounds I use are
YB,0 ≥max⎛⎝0,
k∑
i=k0
−Q⟪k0−i⟫
B,µi
exp[µi]∏ˆj≠iµj
∏ˆt≠i[µi − µt]
⎞⎠ , (12a)
YB,1 ≥max⎛⎝0,
k∑
i=3−k0
−Q⟪k0−i⟫
B,µi
exp[µi]Sˆi
∏ˆt≠i[µi − µt]
⎞⎠ (12b)
4(a) (b)
Average key rate when ℓraw = Average key rate when ℓraw =
Ymax k 10
9 1010 1011 ∞ Ymax k 10
9 1010 1011 ∞
0.1 A 3 2.4 × 10−4 2.9 × 10−4 3.2 × 10−4 3.4 × 10−4 0.1 A 3 3.6 × 10−4 5.6 × 10−4 6.7 × 10−4 7.5 × 10−4
B 3 4.4 × 10−4 5.1 × 10−4 5.4 × 10−4 5.6 × 10−4 B 3 7.6 × 10−4 1.0 × 10−3 1.2 × 10−3 1.3 × 10−3
C 4 4.1 × 10−4 5.7 × 10−4 6.6 × 10−4 7.1 × 10−4 C 4 4.8 × 10−4 9.8 × 10−4 1.3 × 10−3 1.6 × 10−3
D 4 5.6 × 10−4 6.9 × 10−4 7.4 × 10−4 7.7 × 10−4 D 4 8.5 × 10−4 1.3 × 10−3 1.6 × 10−3 1.7 × 10−3
E 5 2.2 × 10−4 5.2 × 10−4 7.2 × 10−4 8.7 × 10−4 E 5 1.2 × 10−4 6.9 × 10−4 1.3 × 10−3 2.0 × 10−3
F 5 5.3 × 10−4 7.3 × 10−4 8.2 × 10−4 8.9 × 10−4 F 5 6.7 × 10−4 1.3 × 10−3 1.7 × 10−3 2.0 × 10−3
G 6 2.2 × 10−5 1.9 × 10−4 5.0 × 10−4 9.9 × 10−4 G 6 2.4 × 10−6 7.8 × 10−5 5.1 × 10−4 2.2 × 10−3
H 6 2.1 × 10−4 5.1 × 10−4 7.4 × 10−4 9.4 × 10−4 H 6 1.1 × 10−4 5.8 × 10−4 1.3 × 10−3 2.1 × 10−3
0.01 A 3 2.4 × 10−5 2.9 × 10−5 3.2 × 10−5 3.3 × 10−5 0.01 A 3 3.6 × 10−5 5.6 × 10−5 6.7 × 10−5 7.5 × 10−5
B 3 4.5 × 10−5 5.1 × 10−5 5.4 × 10−5 5.6 × 10−5 B 3 7.6 × 10−5 1.0 × 10−4 1.2 × 10−4 1.3 × 10−4
C 4 4.1 × 10−5 5.7 × 10−5 6.6 × 10−5 7.1 × 10−5 C 4 4.9 × 10−5 9.8 × 10−5 1.3 × 10−4 1.6 × 10−4
D 4 5.6 × 10−5 6.8 × 10−5 7.4 × 10−5 7.7 × 10−5 D 4 8.5 × 10−5 1.3 × 10−4 1.6 × 10−4 1.7 × 10−4
E 5 2.3 × 10−5 5.2 × 10−5 7.2 × 10−5 8.6 × 10−5 E 5 1.2 × 10−5 6.9 × 10−5 1.3 × 10−4 2.0 × 10−4
F 5 5.3 × 10−5 7.3 × 10−5 8.2 × 10−5 8.8 × 10−5 F 5 6.7 × 10−5 1.3 × 10−4 1.7 × 10−4 2.0 × 10−4
G 6 2.2 × 10−6 1.9 × 10−5 5.0 × 10−5 9.8 × 10−5 G 6 2.3 × 10−7 8.0 × 10−6 5.1 × 10−5 2.2 × 10−4
H 6 2.1 × 10−5 5.1 × 10−5 7.4 × 10−5 9.3 × 10−5 H 6 1.1 × 10−5 5.8 × 10−5 1.3 × 10−4 2.1 × 10−4
TABLE I. Average key rates for different decoy states with emax = 1% for (a) pX = 0.50 and (b) pX = 0.75 over a sample of 10
6
different YB,m’s and EB,m’s. For decoy parameters in case A, µi’s = (0.66,0.05,10
−6) and pµi ’s = (1/3,1/3,1/3). Corresponding
parameters for the other cases are: B: (0.8,0.1,10−6) and (1/2,1/4,1/4); C: (0.8,0.5,0.35,10−6) and (1/2,1/6,1/6,1/6); D:
(1.0,0.67,0.33,10−6) and (1/2,1/6,1/6,1/6); E: (0.8,0.65,0.5,0.35, 10−6 ) and (1/2,1/8,1/8,1/8,1/8); F: (1,0.75,0.5,0.1, 10−6 )
and (1/2,1/8,1/8,1/8,1/8); G: (1,0.8,0.65,0.5,0.35, 10−6 ) and (0.5,0.1,0.1,0.1, 0.1, 0.1); and H: (1,0.8,0.6,0.4, 0.2, 10−6 ) and
(0.5,0.1,0.1,0.1,0.1,0.1).
and
YZ,1eZ,1 ≤min⎛⎝12 ,
k∑
i=k0
[QZ,µiEZ,µi]⟪k0−i⟫ exp[µi]Sˆi
∏ˆt≠i[µi − µt]
⎞⎠ ,
(12c)
where k0 = 1(2) if k is even (odd), and ∏ˆt≠i is over
the dummy variable t from k0 to k but skipping i. Be-
sides, Sˆi = ∑′′ µt1µt2⋯µtk−k0−1 where the double primed
sum is over k0 ≤ t1 < t2 < ⋯ < tk−k0−1 ≤ k with
t1, t2, . . . , tk−k0−1 ≠ i. (I have added the trivial condi-
tions in Eq. (12) to prevent the variables used in Eq. (3)
from taking on absurd values.)
Interestingly, this method reduces to the bounds in
Eq. (4) in the case of k = 3 and µ3 = 0. More impor-
tantly, it is obvious from Eq. (12) that these bounds are
numerically stable provided that the photon intensities
µi’s are not close, say, with differences of at least 1/10 so
that the lost of precision in 1/(µi−µt) is not serious even
taken the intensity fluctuation in realistic source into con-
sideration. (Intensity fluctuation of order of 10−2 is easily
attained in real experiments using a strong intensity and
power stable laser plus suitable attenuators.) In contrast,
it is clear that the m! factor in Eq. (10) is the origin of
the numerical instability of finding YB,m’s for large m’s.
I follow Ref. [6] by using the following security pa-
rameters: ǫcor = 10−15 and ǫsec = κℓfinal, where ℓfinal ≈
RsX/(p2X⟨QX,µ⟩) is the length of the final key and κ =
10−15 can be interpreted as the secrecy leakage per fi-
nal secret bit. Following the derivation in Ref. [6],
χ(k) = 9 + (4k − 2). (The term 4k − 2 comes from
2 × 2⌊k/2⌋+ 2× [2⌊(k − 1)/2⌋+ 1], and the term 9 is inde-
pendent of the number of photon intensities used. Note
that using this method, χ(3) = 19 which is less than the
χ used by the current method [6] by 2. It gives a slightly
higher R.)
I first study the key rate on a dedicated 100 km long
optical fiber system using the channel model in Ref. [6],
whose channel parameters are deduced from the experi-
ment in Ref. [23]. In this system, QB,µ ≈ (1+ pap)(2pdc +
ηsysµ) and QB,µEB,µ ≈ (1+pap)pdc+(emisηch+papηsys/2)µ
for 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1, with after pulse probability pap = 4 × 10−2,
dark count probability pdc = 6 × 10−7, error rate of the
optical system emis = 5×10−3, transmittances of the fiber
and the system ηch = 1×10−2 and ηsys = 1×10−3 [6]. Fixing
sX = 109 and the minimum photon intensity to 1 × 10−6,
while optimizing over pX as well as all other photon in-
tensities µ’s and all the pµ’s, I find that the optimized
one-way key rates for using k = 3,4,5 equal 1.51 × 10−5,
1.57 × 10−5 and 1.46 × 10−5, respectively. That is to say,
using k = 4 in this case increases the key rate by more
than about 4% over the standard k = 3 method.
To further study the general performance on different
channels, I compute the average key rate ⟨R⟩ over a ran-
dom sample of uniformly and independently distributed
YB,m ∈ [0, Ymax] and eB,m ∈ [0, emax] for all m ≥ 0. (But I
set eB,0 = 1/2 as this is the basic assumption on the detec-
tor used. I also set R = 0 for those sample channels whose
key rates from Eq. (3) are negative.) Table I shows ⟨R⟩’s
for various choices of µi’s, pµi ’s, Ymax and ℓmax using ei-
ther unbiased or biased bases selection when emax = 1%.
(Note that the intensities and probabilities of the two
k = 3 cases in the table are adapted from actual exper-
iments [20, 21].) As expected, the general trend is that
the higher the value of k, the higher the average key rate
5in the infinite ℓmax limit. The increase in ⟨R⟩ by using
six photon intensities can be as high as 77%. Whereas for
ℓraw = 109 (1010), using four (five) types of photon inten-
sities performs better because finite-size fluctuations on
QB,µi ’s and EB,µi ’s are relatively smaller. The increase in⟨R⟩ in these cases is at least 26% (12%) using unbiased
(biased) bases selection. Among the cases with the same
k, Table I suggests that those using evenly distributed
µi’s in [0,1] in general have a slightly higher ⟨R⟩. It is
instructive to know why. Lastly, I find that the relative
errors of the bounds YB,1 and YZ,1eZ,1 from their actual
values for cases A–H reduces from ≈ 10−2 to ≈ 10−4 when
k increases from 3 to 6 in the infinite raw key length limit.
An explanation is given in the Appendix.
In summary, I demonstrated the effectiveness of using
more than three photon intensities, with several close
to 1 intensities used with significant chance, to obtain
a high provably secure key rate through tighter bounds
on YB,1 and eZ,1 and at the same time a higher value
of ⟨µ exp(−µ)⟩. Initial study here shows an average of
at least 20% improvement on the average key rate. It
is instructive to further optimize the choice of intensity
parameters µi’s and pµi ’s to see how far one can go.
Appendix A: The Signs Of C0j And C1j
From Eq. (10),
Cm+1,j = (−1)k−mm!
j!
k∑
i=1
µ
j
iSim∏t≠i(µi − µt) (A1)
for all 0 ≤ m ≤ k − 1. From Eq. (11), only the first two
terms in the above sum contain the factor (µ1 − µ2) in
their denominators. And by summing these two terms,
this factor is canceled if j ≥ 0. Note further that Cm+1,j
is a symmetric function of variables µi’s. Hence, Cm+1,j
is a homogeneous polynomial of degree ≤ j − m in the
case of j ≥ m. If j ≥ 1, terms in the degree j ho-
mogeneous polynomial C1j contain the common factor∏kn=1 µn. Therefore, C1j is actually a constant when-
ever 1 ≤ j < k. Whereas for j ≥ k, by counting the
leading power term for µ1 in C1j , I conclude that C1j
is a homogeneous polynomial of degree j. Then, by fix-
ing µ2, µ3, . . . , µk and considering the series expansion of
1/(µ1 − µn)’s in the large µ1 limit, I get
C1j = (−1)k
j!
( k∏
t=1
µt)[µj−k1 k∏
r=2
(1 + µr
µ1
+ µ2r
µ21
+⋯)
+ f(µ2, µ3, . . . , µk)] (A2)
for some function f independent of µ1. As C1j is a ho-
mogeneous polynomial, by equating terms in powers of
µ1, I arrive at
C1j = (−1)k
j!
( k∏
t=1
µt) ∑
t1+⋯+tk=j−k,
t1,...,tk≥0
µt11 µ
t2
2 ⋯µtkk (A3)
for all j ≥ k. As all µi’s are non-negative, I conclude that
C1j ≥ 0 if k is even and C1j ≤ 0 if k is odd with equality
holds if and only if the least photon intensity µn = 0.
The same argument leads to
C2j = (−1)k−1
j!
( k∑
t=1
µ1⋯µt−1µt+1⋯µk)×
∑
t1+⋯+tk=j−k,
t1>0,t2,...,tk≥0
µt11 µ
t2
2 ⋯µtkk + f ′(µ2, µ3, . . . , µk)
(A4)
for all j ≥ k. Here the function f ′ can be found by recur-
sively expanding Eq. (A1) in the same way as Eq. (A2)
in powers of µ2 but with µ1 set to 0, and then in powers
of µ3 with µ1 and µ2 set to 0, and so on. Although the
resultant expression is very complicated, it is easy to see
that C2j < 0 if k is even and C2j > 0 if k is odd. In-
terested readers may apply this method to find explicit
expressions for Cm+1,j ’s for m > 2.
Finally, suppose the bound of YB,1 or YZ,1eZ,1 is ob-
tained from a set K of k′ different photon intensities.
Then, the relative error of the bound of YB,1 from its ac-
tual value is about ∣C2k′ ∣. If one of the used intensities
µr ≈ 0, then Eq. (A4) gives ∣C2k′ ∣ ≈ ∏t∈K∖{r} µt/k′!. For
the choice of parameters in Table I, ∣C2k′ ∣ reduces from
about 2% to 0.03%, which is consistent with the numer-
ical findings. More importantly, this estimation justifies
the use of the least 2⌊k/2⌋ or 2⌊(k − 1)/2⌋ + 1 intensities
to bound the variables in the main text.
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